

Overview


We propose **SCM-MAB**, marrying Multi-armed Bandit (**MAB**) with Structural Causal Model (**SCM**). Whenever the underlying causal mechanism for arms' rewards is well-understood, an agent can play a bandit *more effectively*, while a naive agent, ignorant to such a mechanism, may be *slow* or *failed* to converge.

Multi-armed bandit (MAB) is one of the prototypical sequential decision-making settings found in various real-world applications.

- **Arms:** There are arms **A** in the bandit (i.e., slot machine); each arm associates with a reward distribution,
- **Play:** an agent plays the bandit by pulling an arm $A_x \in \mathbf{A}$ each round,
- **Reward:** a reward Y_x is drawn from the arm's reward distribution,
- **Goal:** to minimize a cumulative regret (CR) over time horizon T .


Multi-armed Bandit through Causal Lens

- pulling an arm = **intervening** on a set of variables (intervention set, IS)
- reward mechanism = **causal mechanism**



- Formally, playing an arm A_x is setting X to x (called **do**), and observing Y drawn from $P(Y|do(X=x))$ where $P(y|do(x)) := \sum_u \mathbf{1}_{r(x,u),y} P(u)$.

Why do we need Causal MABs? A Motivating Example




- **Q:** How many **arms** are there? (We can control 2 binary variables, X_1 and X_2)
- A: Nine.** We need to choose a set among

$$\{\emptyset, \{X_1\}, \{X_2\}, \{X_1, X_2\}\}$$

and then make the corresponding assignment (**all-subsets**). A *naive* combinatorial agent will intervene on $\{X_1, X_2\}$, simultaneously (= 4 arms).

- **Q:** Why is playing $\{X_1, X_2\}$ (**all-at-once**) considered *naive*?

A: This strategy may *miss* the optimal arm, as shown in the simulation below:



There exists a environment (i.e., parametrization) where intervening on X_2 is optimal, and intervening on $\{X_1, X_2\}$, simultaneously is always sub-optimal.

e.g., $X_1 = X_2 \oplus U$, $Y = X_1 \oplus U$. (when $X_2=1$, X_1 carries $\neg U$, and Y checks $X_1 \neq U$)

- **Q:** What are the arms **worth** playing, regardless of the parametrization?

A: Intervening on either $\{X_2\}$ or $\{X_1\}$ can be shown to be sufficient since:

$$\because \text{(i) } \max \mu_{X_2} \geq \max \mu_{\emptyset}, \quad \text{(ii) } \max \mu_{X_1} = \max \mu_{X_1, X_2}, \quad \text{(iii) } \max \mu_{X_2} <> \max \mu_{X_1}$$

SCM-MAB — Connecting Bandits With Structural Causal Models

A Structural Causal Model (**SCM**) \mathcal{M} is a 4-tuple $\langle \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{F}, P(\mathbf{U}) \rangle$:

- **U** is a set of **unobserved** variables (**unknown**);
- **V** is a set of **observed** variables (**known**);
- **F** is a set of **causal mechanisms** for **V** using **U** and **V**;
- $P(\mathbf{U})$ is a joint distribution over the **U** (**randomness**).

The **SCM** allows one to model the underlying causal relations (usually unobserved). The environment where the MAB solver will perform experiments can be modeled as an **SCM**, following the connection established next.

SCM-MAB

- SCM $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{F}, P(\mathbf{U}) \rangle$ and a reward variable $Y \in \mathbf{V}$, $\langle \mathcal{M}, Y \rangle$
- Arms **A** correspond to *all* interventions $\{A_x | x \in D(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{X} \subseteq \mathbf{V} \setminus \{Y\}\}$.
- Reward: distribution $P(Y_x) := P(Y|do(\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{x}))$, expected, $\mu_x := \mathbb{E}[Y|do(\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{x})]$. We assume that a causal graph \mathcal{G} of \mathcal{M} is accessible, but not \mathcal{M} itself.

SCM-MAB Properties — Dependence Structure Across Arms

1. Equivalence among Arms

Two arms share the same reward distribution, i.e.,

$$\mu_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}} = \mu_{\mathbf{x}}$$

whenever intervening on some variables doesn't have a causal effect on the outcome.

→ Test $P(y|do(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z})) = P(y|do(\mathbf{x}))$ through $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp \mathbf{Z} | \mathbf{X}$ in $\mathcal{G}_{\overline{\mathbf{X} \cup \mathbf{Z}}}$ (*do*-calculus).

— **Minimal Intervention Set (MIS, Def. 1)**

- A **minimal** set of variables among ISs sharing the same reward distribution.
- Given that there are sets with the same reward distribution, we would like to intervene on a *minimal* set of variables yielding smaller # of arms.

2. Partial-orderedness among Intervention Sets

A set of variables **X** may be preferred to another set of variables **Z** whenever their maximum achievable expected rewards can be ordered:


$$\mu_{\mathbf{x}^*} = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in D(\mathbf{X})} \mu_{\mathbf{x}} \geq \max_{\mathbf{z} \in D(\mathbf{Z})} \mu_{\mathbf{z}} = \mu_{\mathbf{z}^*}$$

— **Possibly-Optimal Minimal Intervention Set (POMIS, Def. 2)**

- Each **MIS** that can achieve an optimal expected reward in some SCM \mathcal{M} conforming to the causal graph \mathcal{G} is called a **POMIS**.
- Clearly, pulling non-POMISs will incur regrets and delay the identification of the optimal arms.

Toy Examples for MISs and POMISs

(* a dashed bidirected edge = existence of an unobserved confounder)



Same **MISs** $\{\emptyset, \{X\}, \{Z\}\}$ since $do(x) = do(x, z)$ for $z \in D(Z)$.

POMIS are $\{\{X\}\}, \{\emptyset, \{X\}\}, \{\{Z\}, \{X\}\}, \{\emptyset, \{Z\}, \{X\}\}$

- We characterized a complete condition whether an IS is a (**PO**)MIS.
- We devised an algorithmic procedure to enumerate all (**PO**)MIS given $\langle \mathcal{G}, Y \rangle$.

Empirical Evaluation

4 strategies \times 2 base MAB solvers \times 3 tasks; ($T = 10k, 300$ simulations)


Strategies

- **Brute-force:** all possible arms, $\{\mathbf{x} \in D(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{X} \subseteq \mathbf{V} \setminus \{Y\}\}$ (aka **all-subsets**)
- **All-at-once:** intervene on all variables simultaneously, $D(\mathbf{V} \setminus \{Y\})$
- **MIS:** arms related to MISs
- **POMIS:** arms related to POMISs

Base MAB solvers


Thompson Sampling (TS) and kl-UCB

Tasks



Results

(**top**) averaged cumulative regrets and (**bottom**) optimal arm probability
TS in solid lines, kl-UCB in dashed lines



- CRs: **Brute-force** \geq **MIS** \geq **POMIS** (smaller the better)
- If the number of arms for **All-at-once** is *smaller* than **POMIS**, then, it implies that **All-at-once** is missing possibly-optimal arms.

Conclusions

- Introduced **SCM-MAB** = MAB + SCM = $\frac{\text{MAB}}{\text{SCM}}$.
- Characterized structural properties (equivalence, partial-orderedness) in SCM-MAB given a causal graph.
- Studied conditions under which intervening on a set of variables might be optimal (POMIS).
- Empirical results corroborate theoretical findings.

► We have a *new* paper to be presented at **AAAI'2019**

- Introduced **non-manipulability** constraints (not all variables are intervenable),
- Characterized **MISs / POMISs** w/ the constraints,
- Introduced novel strategy to leverage structural relationships across arms with improved finite-sample properties.

Papers at causalai.net

Code at <https://github.com/sanghack81/SCMMAB-NIPS2018>